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Abstract: Biodiversity offsets are applied in many countries to compensate for impacts on the
environment, but research on regulatory frameworks and implementation enabling effective offsets is
lacking. This paper reviews research on biodiversity offsets, providing a framework for the analysis
of program design (no net loss goal, uncertainty and ratios, equivalence and accounting, site selection,
landscape-scale mitigation planning, timing) and implementation (compliance, adherence to the
mitigation hierarchy, leakage and trade-offs, oversight, transparency and monitoring). Some more
challenging aspects concern the proper metrics and accounting allowing for program evaluation,
as well as the consideration of trade-offs when regulations focus only on the biodiversity aspect of
ecosystems. Results can be used to assess offsets anywhere and support the creation of programs that
balance development and conservation.
Keywords: biodiversity offsets; no net loss; offset design; offset implementation;
compensation; mitigation
1. Introduction
Noticing an increasing pressure on ecosystems due to development, governments have
implemented various policy approaches to protect ecosystems and halt, or at least slow down, the decline
of biodiversity. One approach has been the implementation of impact mitigation regulations [1],
aiming at internalizing external the environmental cost of development. Where command and control
approaches (strict regulatory prohibition) failed to avoid air pollution [2], allowing compensation for
unavoidable impacts introduced flexibility, and then spread to other environmental policies: after all
avoidance and minimization measures are exhausted, compensation offers a compromise between
socio-economic objectives and nature conservation. The United States and Germany introduced
policies to assess the environmental impacts of actions and required mitigation as early as the 1970s [3].
Their model, including the mitigation hierarchy—avoid, minimize, and compensate for residual,
unavoidable impacts—is applied in many countries today. We acknowledge that there are differences
in terminology and in the definition of the mitigation hierarchy. We use the term compensation to
describe on-site measures ensuring the functionality of the impact site, as well as off-site measures to
compensate for adverse impacts. Compensation measures can include conservation, management,
restoration/rehabilitation, enhancement, and creation/establishment of habitat (other terms may also
be used to describe these actions). What we do not consider here is restoration/rehabilitation after the
project is decommissioned, as it takes place after the fact, whereas the other steps are taken before the
impact occurs.
One central biodiversity policy goal is the conservation and/or restoration of nature, which can
include the preservation of existing, as well as the rehabilitation or enhancement of degraded, resources.
These approaches have also been applied in offset programs to compensate for impacts. The Business and
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Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP 2012) defines biodiversity offsets as ‘measurable conservation
outcomes resulting from actions designed to compensate for significant residual adverse biodiversity
impacts arising from project development after appropriate prevention and mitigation measures have
been taken. The goal of biodiversity offsets is to achieve no net loss (NNL) and, preferably, a net gain,
of biodiversity with respect to species composition, habitat structure, ecosystem function and people’s
use and the cultural values associated with biodiversity [4]. To bring more clarity into the terminology,
Brownlie et al. (2013) define the term ‘compensation’ as a scenario in which a tradeoff occurs, whereas
an ‘offset’ assures at least no net loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services (ES) [5]. However, in
the context of this paper, the terms ‘compensation’ and ‘offset’ will be used interchangeably for ease
of reading.
Many scholars have discussed biodiversity offsets [6–10]. Effective offsets must counterbalance
the impacts of a project, bring measurable long-term benefits, and produce desired results [11].
The effectiveness of offset programs strongly depends on the policy framework and implementation
thereof [12–14]. Legislation provides a basic conceptualization as it sets a frame for implementation
and applies existing paradigms, i.e., the polluter pays principle. Although some have come up with
evaluation frameworks [15] and partial evaluations of offset programs [16,17], a “a need for “proof of
concept” and successful implementation remains” [18] (p. 393). Many authors have pointed out that the
success of offsets is unclear [6,11,19,20]. Different opinions on offsetting are reflected in the literature:
Spash (2015) argues that the economic concepts applied in offsetting legitimize habitat destruction
instead of preventing it [21]. Some criticize offsets from a social perspective (e.g., social equity,
considering the redistribution of nature), others from natural sciences (e.g., considering baselines)
or integrated perspectives (e.g., considering time-lag) [9]. Hrabanski (2015) lists a number of major
points of criticism: whereas some voice more ‘radical criticism’ opposing the idea of natural capital,
and a commodification of nature, doubting the effectiveness of offsets, others apply ‘reformist criticism’
aimed at a lack of monitoring and difficulties in assessment, irreplaceability of environmental resources
and metrics, weakening of legislation, spatial distribution issues, and a weakening of the avoidance
requirement [2]. Approaches to the latter provide a framework to analyze offset programs as an
effective instrument in combining development with conservation. This also contributes to research
concerning socio-economic conditions and regulatory frameworks enabling effective offsets [6].
Lapeyre et al. (2015) point out the importance of differentiating between different types of offsets
in furthering the state of research; ‘one should rather precisely analyse each policy instrument or
scheme on the ground, and disentangle its institutional and economic characteristics as well as its
relations to market mechanisms and their main features’ [3]. In this paper, we focus on offsets that are
implemented in mandated frameworks, e.g., non-voluntary offsets that are legally required through
legislation to compensate for impacts on biodiversity. Within such a framework the developer can
implement compensation measures or, if allowed, use a third-party. Some offsets may be placed
within a regulation-driven market context (e.g., conservation banking, as explained below). One of
the strictest legal frameworks for biodiversity protection is the 1973 U.S. Endangered Species Act
(ESA). Compensation under ESA can be implemented using various mechanisms where either the
permittee implements compensation projects, or a third party takes on this responsibility. Besides
permittee-responsible mitigation (PRM: The developer implements project-specific compensation
measures on- or off-site) or in-lieu fees (ILF: A third-party form of compensation in which a third
party collects a fee from developers and implements measures to take care of multiple compensation
requirements) the developer may buy credits from a conservation bank (‘a site, or suite of sites [ . . . ],
that is conserved and managed in perpetuity, and provides ecological functions and services expressed
as credits for specified species or resources, that are later transferred or sold to others for use as
compensation for impacts occurring elsewhere to the same species.’ [22] (p. 2). We use also use term
‘biodiversity bank’ as an umbrella term for conservation banks, species banks and habitat banks in this
paper). The bank sponsor is then responsible for the maintenance and success of the compensation
project. Benefits of biodiversity banks include better conservation outcomes, advanced mitigation and
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higher efficiency due to economies of scale [23–27]. The ESA aims to conserve and protect listed species
and their habitat. Although more than 170 conservation banks exist today [28], there is little literature
on their implementation or effectiveness [29]. This paper provides a framework for the assessment of
biodiversity offset programs such as the conservation banking program to draw implications for their
effectiveness. The framework outlined here can also support the creation of new offset programs.
Methodology and Aim
This paper is based on peer reviewed literature, grey literature and legislation (the sources of the
grey literature were reviewed critically before including them, we mainly use studies and guidance
documents from federal agencies or non-government entities such as BBOP). The literature was
accumulated between November 2017 and November 2018 using ScienceDirect, Thomson Reuters
‘Web of Science’ and Google (Scholar) to search for papers published in English from after 2000.
Search terms included ‘offset’, ‘compensation’, ‘mitigation’, ‘biodiversity bank’, ‘habitat bank’ and
‘conservation bank’ on their own and in combination with ‘design’, ‘implementation’, ‘effectiveness’,
‘success’, and ‘compliance’. Papers that didn’t provide information on offset program design and
implementation were excluded based on the full paper content (not just the abstracts). A snowball
approach was used to identify additional relevant papers. We identified recurring aspects discussed in
the papers and clustered the content in an iterative-inductive approach, which resulted in Table 1.
The overall research question is ‘which aspects must be considered in offset program design and
implementation to create an effective biodiversity offset program?’. Concerning the improvement in
existing and future offset programs, there appear to be two major groups of authors; (a) those that
discuss design issues and improvements thereof, and (b) those that deal with the actual implementation
and effectiveness of offsets. The state of research and open questions in each of these groups are
discussed in the following subchapters to answer our research question. We contribute to a better
understanding of what comprises effective offsets, providing a framework to analyze program design
and the implementation of biodiversity offset programs.
2. Results: A Framework for Effective Offsets
This chapter discusses aspects of effective offset program design and implementation. Table 1 at
the end of this chapter provides a summary of the factors discussed in in this paper (partially overlaps
with a categorization established by [8]). Clearly, some of these aspects cannot be categorized clearly
and are strongly interconnected (see Figure 1 in discussion).
2.1. Offset Design
A number of authors have discussed the technical design of offsets with the aim to improve
conservation outcomes and reach NNL or a net gain [18,30,31]. The effectiveness of offset programs
is strongly dependent on the policy framework, offset design, the implementation thereof and
compliance [12].
2.1.1. No Net Loss and Additionality
NNL or a net gain should be the goal of offset policies in order to halt the loss of biodiversity [4,18,32].
Overall, the policy goal and the resources protected must be clearly defined [31,33]. It must be clear
whether NNL refers to acres of habitat, the number of individual animals or their conservation status
(‘NNL of what?’ [34]): NNL can have different meanings depending on what the goal refers to [32].
Therefore, the legislators must define the frame of reference, e.g., the status before the impact or
business-as-usual scenario in which biodiversity declines (‘no net loss compared with what?’ [34]).
Without such a clear goal, offset programs’ success in reaching their goals cannot be evaluated. To reach
NNL, offsets should provide additional conservation outcomes, measured not only by area, but also
ecological quality (the determination of what constitutes ecological quality depends on the aim of the
NNL goal and should be reflected in the metrics and methods applied) [35–37]. For, if additionality is
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not provided, NNL cannot be attained [9]. Additionality describes the idea that the offset should bring
additional conservation outcomes that would not have occurred without the offset. Additionality
is measured in relation to a baseline that could, for example, be based on a business-as-usual or a
counterfactual scenario. Baselines are crucial to allow the measuring of biodiversity benefits and prove
additionality on a project scale, as well as program success on a policy scale [38]. The baseline is ‘a
state or trajectory (e.g., of a system) used as a comparator. The term is used in many contexts: shifting
baseline is often used to refer to the way in which our concept of what is ‘normal’ or ‘pre-impact’
changes over time (e.g., Papworth et al., 2009; Pauly, 1995); baseline data often refers to data that reflect
the starting-point or reference state of a system before some expected perturbation (or restoration)
(e.g., Downs et al., 2011); a baseline site can refer to a ‘control’ or ‘reference’ site in an experimental
design or natural experiment (e.g., Brinck and Frost, 2009; Golding et al., 1997); a baseline trajectory is
a counterfactual trajectory that describes how a system is expected to behave in the absence of some
perturbation or action (e.g., Costa et al., 2000)’ [38] (p. 505). The baseline used to quantify the value of
the compensation measures must reflect the frame of reference of the NNL policy goal. In addition, all
losses must be accounted for properly, for ‘what is not measures, is not compensated’ [39]. Protection or
‘averted loss offsets’ may pose an obstacle to reaching an NNL goal [18,38–42] as they ‘only’ conserve
existing habitats. Bull et al. (2015) refer to this question as the ‘how’ of offsetting [43]. This offset
type may be appropriate where the rate of loss of biodiversity is high, and large, intact areas can be
protected from development [18,44]. In this case, additionality would be provided compared to a
counterfactual scenario (what the state of the site would be if it weren’t protected). Gibbons et al. (2016)
apply a calculator to find out when NNL is feasible, and find that averted loss offsets are only feasible
for ‘biodiversity that is declining under the counterfactual at an annual rate ≥6%’ (with discount
rate 3%, and offset ratios ≤ 10:1, [45] (p.256)). Buschke (2017) points out that NNL with averted loss
offsets is most feasible when ‘(a) the initial loss of biodiversity is small, (b) the background decline
in biodiversity is rapid and (c) conservation interventions are effective’ [46], and that the shape of
the biodiversity trajectory affects the outcome as well, and therefore should be included in the offset
planning. Moilanen and Laitila (2016) provide some other criteria: (a) if otherwise no compensation
would take place, (b) if biodiversity, time lag, leakage and uncertainties were accounted for, (c) when
trading up, (d) if ‘the price paid includes a permanent regional reduction in utilization of natural
resources’ [40] (p.109).
Relevant questions are: What is the policy goal (NNL of what and compared to what scenario)?
Are additional conservation outcomes required and accounted for? What is the frame of reference?
Is additionality provided compared to a baseline or a counterfactual scenario? Does the chosen
baseline/counterfactual reflect the frame of reference of the NNL goal?
2.1.2. Uncertainty and Ratios
Risk and uncertainties, such as climate change effects or uncertainty due to limited knowledge,
can affect NNL as well as the offsetting program [35,47–49]. Uncertainty is inherent in biodiversity
conservation and can increase with climate change [50]. It can relate to the lack or interpretation
of data, concepts and proxies [51]. Potential conflicts between land uses, unexpected costs, and
other unexpected factors can also affect the offsetting. In addition to strict regulatory requirements,
for example, concerning advance mitigation or financial safeguards, mitigation ratios can provide a
tool for this [18,31,52–54]. They can account for governance, social and technical challenges, and lead
to better conservation outcomes [37,55,56]. They can vary depending on time-lag, type of ecosystem,
and uncertainty and offset activity (e.g., protection, restoration, creation). A number of authors discuss
the importance of ratios or multipliers in achieving at least NNL [18,31,52]. However, currently applied
ratios are not sufficient to counteract risk of failure, time lags and uncertainties [52]. Tallis et al. (2016)
call for a replicable and transparent offset-ratio method to combine relevant variables to establish
ratios [54]. Overall, offsets do not constitute a remedy for failed offset projects (e.g., in cases of wildfire).
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Relevant questions are: Does the regulatory framework acknowledge and consider uncertainties?
What kind of uncertainties are acknowledged and accounted for? How is uncertainty dealt with?
Which criteria influence mitigation ratios? Are they set transparently?
2.1.3. Equivalence and Accounting
Equivalence of impact and offset can refer to the proper amount of compensation, but herein
will mostly refer to the type and function. The flexibility here lies in ‘in-kind’ vs. ‘out-of-kind’
compensation [43,44,54,57,58]. Some authors discuss ‘trading up’ to aim offsets at high priority species
or habitats [31,35,43,59]. The idea is to aim offsetting efforts at high priority species or habitats instead
of the species or habitats impaired at the impact site if they are of less importance. Still, based on
the overall policy goal, the definition of equivalence can focus on ecosystem services (ES), utility,
species or habitats or functional equivalence [23]. What is being accounted for at biodiversity banks
is referred to as ‘credit metrics’ and affects the aim of conservation efforts and functioning of the
regulatory market [9,60]. Options are vast; indicators can be practice or performance based and focus
on area, functionality, species or habitat [60–64]. Moreno-Mateos et al. (2015) discuss ecological,
non-instrumental (intrinsic, cultural) and instrumental (ES) values of biodiversity that should be
accounted for to avoid ecological as well as ethical losses [39]. Transparent and effective accounting
that goes beyond acreage is needed [35]. Accounting metrics (e.g., the quality or extent of a habitat,
number of individual species) and methods (the accounting method in which the metrics are embedded
establishes how the biodiversity value is measured e.g., how different metrics and potentially other
indicators are combined to calculate the biodiversity value) should be identical at both impact and
compensation sites and reflect the policy goal.
Relevant questions are: Are offsets in-kind? What metrics are used? Are the same metrics used at
impact and compensation site? Do the metrics reflect the policy goal?
2.1.4. Site Selection and Spatial Relation to the Impact Site
Another aspect is the spatial relation to the impact site (on-site vs. off-site compensation) [43,44,
59,65–68]. On-site mitigation can maintain some of the functionality of the impact site, but can also be
affected by the surrounding development area (e.g., edge effects) as the compensation site will be rather
small compared to larger areas, where third-parties consolidate multiple compensation requirements.
However, on-site mitigation does not lead a redistribution of natural resources to more rural areas.
In addition, off-site compensation can be sited to support landscape-scale conservation goals, but site
selection can also be affected by land prices and availability. Third party compensation is always
provided off-site, and the location should make ecological sense (e.g., consider species distribution,
habitat connectivity, ecological functionality). Landscape-scale conservation goals can influence site
selection. A biodiversity bank is assigned a service area, outlining the geographic region in which
credits can be sold to developers [22]. There are various approaches to the definition of the service
areas; for example, Tallis et al. (2016) suggest the serviceshed of ecosystem services as the proper
range [56,69] (‘the spatial extent of a serviceshed is determined by the area that supports biophysical
service production, and allows beneficiaries both physical and institutional access to the service (Tallis
and Polasky, 2009)’ [69] (p.25)). The size of the area is closely tied to the question of the distribution of
nature, and associated social, economic and environmental impacts [54,70–72]. These aspects should be
considered when determining offset sites and service areas as they can have implications for reaching
policy goals, access to nature for recreational purposes and the feasibility of a biodiversity bank.
Relevant questions are: Is compensation required on- or off-site and why? What are criteria for
offset site selection (e.g., species distribution, habitat connectivity, ecological functionality, etc.)? What
are the criteria for determining the service area (or requirements concerning the spatial relation of
impact and offset site)? Are ecological, social and economic aspects considered?
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2.1.5. Landscape-Scale Mitigation Planning
Sochi et al. (2016) point out that most offset policies focus on one or a small number of biodiversity
features, and provide a mitigation framework in which the ‘full suite of conservation priorities in a region’
are supported, and discuss a number of design safeguards to provide effective offsetting programs [35]
(p.320). Various authors have acknowledged and discussed a trend away from project-by-project
compensation planning towards landscape-scale mitigation planning (‘an approach to conservation
planning that applies the mitigation hierarchy for impacts to resources and their values, services, and
functions at the relevant scale, however narrow or broad, necessary to sustain, or otherwise achieve
established goals for those resources and their values, services, and functions.’ [22], see [73] for a
more detailed discussion of the approach), highlighting the potential benefits associated with such an
approach [1,18,35,42,43,54,57,74–78]. Associated benefits include assessment of cumulative effects, cost
savings, quicker permitting processes, better conservation outcomes through larger, well-connected
areas, and contribution towards strategic conservation goals [ibid.]. Overall, landscape-scale mitigation
planning suggests using large-scale conservation plans to inform the application of the mitigation
hierarchy. However, no empirical studies regarding the effectiveness of the approach have been
undertaken [79].
Relevant questions are: Are landscape-scale conservation objectives (e.g., species recovery plans,
habitat conservation plans, landscape plans, biotope networks, Natura 2000 networks, conservation
strategies) considered in impact and mitigation planning? How? Is there a comprehensive conservation
planning system that can inform mitigation or do plans need to be stablished first?
2.1.6. Advance Mitigation
One major issue with impact mitigation is time-lag: if an impact occurs before the compensation
measures are completed and functional resources are lost [37]. This can be avoided by providing advance
mitigation, which is argued to bring ecological benefits, such as improved mitigation quality and
alignment with strategic conservation goals, as well as benefits for the permittee [26,41,43,55,57,80–83].
The permittee can benefit from quicker permitting processes and cost savings due to economies of scale,
lower transaction costs and lower direct mitigation cost (e.g., land prices and inflation) [81]. However,
unless third parties are involved, funding for compensation is usually only generated when the impact
is permitted. Time discounting offset ratios can help in this case, as higher ratios are required when
compensating immediate loss with future biodiversity gains [84,85].
Relevant questions are: Is the offset site functional before the impact occurs? If not, are time
discounting and ratios applied?
2.1.7. Perpetuity
The long-term stewardship and functionality of compensation sites is a major success factor in
reaching policy goals [8,9,86]. Conservation easements and other tools exist to protect sites in the
long run. Depending on the overall policy goal and the definition of additionality [32] long-term
protection either provides ‘enough’ benefits to offset an environmental impact (see discussion on
averted loss offsets above), or must be combined with management to provide additional conservation
outcomes [86]. Overall, long-term management and monitoring are questions of the banking operation,
compliance and enforcement. The latter strongly depends on the implementation’s framework and
institutional capacities, as discussed below.
Relevant questions for analysis are: Are offset sites secured and managed in perpetuity? How?
By whom?
2.2. Implementation and Compliance
Although many authors discuss the aspects discussed above, there are very few studies that
empirically test compliance in real-life permitting processes. Design related factors strongly influence
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the permitting process and compliance with legislation [13] and the organizational capacity of
overseeing institutions can affect their implementation [16]. A potential risk is the misuse of offsets
to reach business-as-usual conservation goals [87–90], or ineffective offsets that allow otherwise
unpermittable impacts [18,21,49,91,92]. This section also focuses on factors that are strongly influenced
by the permitting process and actual compliance with regulatory frameworks.
2.2.1. Avoidance and Adherence to the Mitigation Hierarchy
Avoidance and adherence to the mitigation hierarchy—avoid, minimize, compensate—play a
major role in effective mitigation policies [18,31,93–97]. Even proponents of biodiversity offsets state
that some impacts cannot be offset [9], questioning the ‘offsettability’ or ‘irreplaceability’ of certain
species, habitats or ecosystems [18,39,43,56,98–101]. Tallis et al. (2016) call for ecosystem services
thresholds to identify no-go areas for development [54]. Landscape-scale approaches can also help to
identify such areas.
Relevant questions are: Is compensation only allowed after all options of avoidance and
minimization have been exhausted? Are impact permits denied due to the irreplaceability of resources
or due to a lack of avoidance? Is there a threshold determining which impacts are ‘offsettable’?
2.2.2. Leakage and Trade-Offs
Another challenge is avoiding leakage and trade-offs when permitting impacts [5,18,40,102].
Leakage refers to a displacement of impacts to an area outside the offset program boundaries: ‘Leakage
means the phenomenon of environmentally damaging activity relocating elsewhere after being stopped
locally by avoided loss offsetting. Indirect leakage means that locally avoided losses displace to other
administrative areas or spread around diffusely via market effects.’ [35] (p. 106). Direct and indirect
leakage can be influenced by the organization doing the resource extraction, mitigation ratios, the type of
resource extracted, and in-kind vs. out-of-kind leakage [40]. Trade-offs can occur when the management
of an offset site for one environmental resource can be detrimental to another. This is an especially
crucial aspect when regulations only protect one aspect of the ecosystem or only one ecosystem
service (e.g., biodiversity), but development can impair other ecosystem functions as well (e.g., carbon
sequestration or water retention). Trade-offs are difficult to measure, especially when multiple agencies
are involved and no strategic oversight exists [40]. However, these issues can be managed with careful
monitoring, tracking and oversight. Another option could be a more comprehensive regulation, such
as the German impact mitigation regulation that covers the functionality of the ecosystem as well as
landscape scenery.
Relevant questions are: Are additional offset programs or other regulation in places beyond the
program boundaries that can reduce or avoid leakage? Are additional regulations in place that protect
ecosystem components that are not covered by the offset program to avoid trade-offs when managing
only for biodiversity? Is there strategic oversight across agencies and ecosystem components to avoid
these phenomena?
2.2.3. Oversight, Transparency and Monitoring
Few papers discuss regulatory compliance [95,103,104] and monitoring [18,53,96]. But authors
such as Sahley et al. (2017) document how large-scale monitoring can inform mitigation and restoration
priorities in Peru [105]. Overall, strict oversight and transparency in the permitting process is a major
factor in determining program success [106–108]. One or multiple agencies must provide standards,
fairness and accountability [78]. It is crucial to collect comparable data on impacts and compensation
sites across agencies to allow program assessment and improvement. To allow for proper monitoring,
the availability of baseline data that reflects the frame of reference of the NNL policy goal may be
an issue if the frame of reference is not the state at the time of project development. In addition,
the collection of comparable data for monitoring requires standardized methods for monitoring that
reflect the policy goal as well as the institutional capacity for its enforcement.
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Relevant questions are: What are the monitoring requirements for compensation sites? Are there
comparable data on impacts and offsets? Is that data analyzed to assess the overall program success?
Table 1. Summary of Aspects of Program Design and Implementation.
Offset Program Design Implementation and Compliance
No Net Loss and Additionality [4,9,31–38] Avoidance and Adherence to the MitigationHierarchy [18,31,39,93–101]
Uncertainty and Ratios [18,31,35,37,47–49,53–56] Leakage and Trade-Offs [5,18,40,102]
Equivalence and Accounting
[23,31,35,43,44,57,58,60–64]
Oversight, Transparency and Monitoring
[53,78,99,100,103–108]
Site Selection and Spatial Relation to the Impact Site
[43,44,54,65–68,70–72]
Landscape-Scale Mitigation Planning [35,42,43,73–79]
Advance Mitigation [26,37,41,43,57,80–83]
Perpetuity [8,9,86]
3. Discussion and Conclusion
The framework above provides a two-step approach to offset assessment; (1.) the proper design
of the regulatory framework, and (2.) the actual implementation and compliance. The regulatory
framework is only a starting point and the implementation in practice—from the permitting process
for impacts and offsets to proper oversight—is the real question concerning effective offsets (discussed
below). Overall, the aspects discussed are strongly connected and cannot be categorized clearly
(Figure 1). To begin with, almost all aspects affect the overall NNL policy goal: by avoiding temporal
loss, advanced mitigation contributes to this goal while also reducing uncertainties (which, in turn,
threaten the goal). In addition, the metrics and credits chosen to measure impacts and offsets also
measure and determine whether equivalence and additionality (proven by a proper baseline) are
obtained. Both additionality and equivalence, strongly affect whether an NNL goal is reached.
Mitigation ratios can contribute to additionality by requiring higher amounts of compensation. On a
more strategic note, landscape-scale mitigation planning can be used to avoid leakage and trade-offs
and it can inform the application of the mitigation hierarchy, as well as compensation site selection.
Perpetual management affects the long-term success of the program. Oversight, transparency and
monitoring should function as an umbrella, ensuring compliance, tracking and an evaluation of overall
program success.
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Overall, the framework presented here is based on the literature published in English, which may
exclude relevant insight published in other languages. It is possible that some stakeholders disagree and
this must be reflected in the context of the specific regulatory and institutional conditions of each offset
program. We advised the master’s thesis of Eva Ulfeld who conducted five semi-structured interviews
with different stakeholders in California (bank sponsors, developers, agencies, consultants) to test the
validity of this framework [109]. She found that all stakeholders listed most of the aspects named above
when asked what must be considered for effective offset program design and implementation. She also
found that one aspect was missing: cooperation between agencies and other stakeholders, which is
discussed below. It is crucial to point out that many of the compiled aspects above can be discussed in
more detail in the context of specific offsetting programs. In this section, we also discuss some general
issues with regard to some of these aspects. One major point of international discourse is whether the
goal of NNL or a net gain is even attainable and how it could be reached. The current state of research
is that we don’t know: many offset frameworks do not clearly define what exactly NNL refers to and
most programs are lacking overall success evaluations. In order to even attempt the latter, we need a
clear definition of NNL (of what, and compared to which, scenario?) as well as standardized metrics
and methods that reflect the overall program goal. The framework we present here can be used as a
tool for analysis of existing offset programs to see what shortfalls the program might have, and to draw
implications for its effectiveness and identify possible improvements. The NNL goal also affects what
baseline is relevant, what criteria must determine the site selection process and what is considered
appropriate ecological quality at the offset site. It can even affect landscape-scale conservation planning,
as the overarching plans and mitigation should benefit each other. The program goal trickles down
through all relevant aspects. Thus, we must generally ask whether this goal is reflected throughout the
program design and implementation.
As mentioned above, the implementation in practice determines whether offset program goals
are attained or not. The organizational capacity of all stakeholders involved, as well as the overall
institutional framework, with clear responsibilities, play a crucial role in this [34,109]. For example, the
standardization of fair and equable metrics, methods, ratios and site selection criteria is not an easy task
(standardization across offset programs and even across administrative borders could be an approach
to reduce leakage by establishing at least similar requirements for developers); depending on the NNL
(e.g., improved conservation status for individual species) different assessment methods may be needed
for each species. This requires data, research and resources, in addition to stakeholder involvement, to
increase acceptability of the established standards. Cooperation between different stakeholders is also
an important step in landscape-scale mitigation approaches, as different land use sectors, as well as
potentially conflicting environmental objectives, must be united [72]. Cooperation can be challenging
when different levels of governance with different regulations, jurisdictions and agencies are involved
(e.g., centralized vs. federal policy structure); tiering gives different responsibilities to different levels,
and therefore implementation and administrative oversight may vary across regions or agencies. Also,
different agencies may implement different regulations and therefore follow different objectives, but
also need to cooperate in order to avoid trade-offs. Trade-offs may be difficult to notice when agency
jurisdictions only cover certain components of ecosystems and no strategic oversight exists. Overall,
agencies must have sufficient capacity for monitoring, enforcement and evaluation. The specific context,
however, is offset program specific, and must be discussed in the analysis of any offset program. This
does not only cover the offsetting side of the regulations, but also the impact permit side; consistent
methods must be applied to assess the impacts and strict enforcement, for example, considering
whether avoidance and what is even ‘offsettable’, are also needed. Landscape-scale conservation
objectives can help determine ‘no-go-areas’ based on irreplaceable environmental resources.
Biodiversity offsets can provide a compromise between conservation and development, if designed
and implemented prudently. This framework provides aspects that need to be considered to
provide effective offset programs, including biodiversity banks. Some critical scholars fear flawed
offset design and implementation facilitating development, calling for a halt of their application.
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However, an empirical evaluation of programs, such as conservation banking, is needed before
dismissing or supporting any policy instrument.
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